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Juking Access to Justice to Deregulate the Legal
Market
MILAN MARKOVIC*

ABSTRACT
Study after study has concluded that the United States suffers from a lack of
access to justice because most legal issues are addressed without attorney
involvement. To better serve Americans who cannot currently afford legal
assistance, scholars have argued that corporations should be permitted to offer
legal services. England and Australia already allow corporations to own law
firms and deliver legal services.
Whatever the merits of corporate delivery of legal services, its impact on
access to justice has been overstated. The cost of legal services plays a minor role
in decisions to not obtain legal assistance. Moreover, many legal services are
relatively affordable, and those that are currently cost-prohibitive such as
complex litigation cannot be delivered ethically at significantly lower prices.
Whereas the legal profession has largely assumed that legal services are very
valuable and highly sought after, low- and middle-income people also appear to
not prioritize legal assistance and may not benefit from assistance in some
situations.
To expand access to justice, the legal profession should educate the public
about common legal problems and reconsider ethical rules that hinder attorneys
from soliciting business and marketing their services. Legal aid and pro bono
resources should be targeted to significant legal problems that cannot be
addressed without attorney involvement. Increasing the supply of low-cost legal
services providers would merely exacerbate existing inequalities in the legal
system while failing to address the need for high quality legal representation with
respect to complex matters.

* Associate Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law. J.D., Georgetown University Law
Center (2006); M.A., New York University (2003); B.A. Columbia University (2001). I would like to thank
Sahar Aziz, Susan Fortney, Malcolm Mercer, Peter Reilly, Dana Remus, Rebecca Sanderfur, Greg Vetter, and
Gina Warren for their assistance with this Article. Parts of this Article were presented at the Reconsidering
Access to Justice Conference held at the Texas A&M University School of Law in May 2015. © 2016, Milan
Markovic.
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INTRODUCTION
Expanding access to justice has long been one of the legal profession’s
foremost priorities. In 1938, Charles Clark, the Dean of Yale Law School,
bemoaned the failure of lawyers to “meet the social needs which justify the
existence of his profession” and urged the organized bar to “meet the issue of
maldistribution of legal service.”1 The Supreme Court claimed in its 1977

1. Charles E. Clark & Emma Corstvet, The Lawyer and the Public: An A.A.L.S. Survey, 47 YALE L.J. 1272,
1275 (1938).

2016]

JUKING ACCESS TO JUSTICE

65

decision in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona that “[t]he middle 70% of our population
is not being reached or served adequately by the legal profession” and that
attorney advertising would allow the public to more easily locate qualified
attorneys.2 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”) currently
exhort lawyers to “seek improvement . . . of access to the legal system”3 and
“provide legal services to those unable to pay.”4
Despite the enormous amount of attention devoted to access to justice, study
after study has concluded that the vast majority of Americans’ civil legal needs
are addressed without attorneys.5 This problem has ostensibly worsened since the
recent economic recession.6 When a large percentage of the population is
effectively foreclosed from obtaining legal representation, the promise of “Equal
Justice Under Law” would seem to ring hollow.7
Of course, Americans—especially those of limited means—lack access to a
wide variety of goods and services, not just legal services.8 What differentiates
the legal market from most other markets, however, is that lawyers possess a
virtual monopoly over the provision of legal services.9 Lack of access to

2.
3.
4.
5.

Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 376 (1977) (citations omitted).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2013) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
MODEL RULES R. 6.1.
See, e.g., THE TASK FORCE TO EXPAND ACCESS TO CIVIL LEGAL SERVS., N.Y., REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 1–2 (2013), http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/access-civil-legal-services/PDF/CLS-Task
ForceReport_2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/PUA3-4FKE] (last visited Oct. 5, 2015); LEGAL SERVS. CORP.,
DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME
AMERICANS 1 (2009), http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/pdfs/documenting_the_justice_gap_in_america_
2009.pdf [http://perma.cc/K2F7-YQTQ] [hereinafter LSC REPORT]; DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ACCESS TO JUSTICE
COMM’N, JUSTICE FOR ALL?: AN EXAMINATION OF THE CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA’S
LOW-INCOME COMMUNITY V (2008), http://www.dcaccesstojustice.org/files/CivilLegalNeedsReport.pdf [http://
perma.cc/JJE5-FWHR] [hereinafter DC REPORT]; AM. BAR ASS’N, LEGAL NEEDS AND CIVIL JUSTICE: A SURVEY
OF AMERICANS 8 (1994), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/
legalneedstudy.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/WWL3-B2N9] [hereinafter ABA SURVEY].
6. See LSC REPORT, supra note 5, at 28.
7. See David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-Interest Lawyers, 91 CAL.
L. REV. 209, 212 (2003).
8. See Charles Silver & Frank B. Cross, What’s Not to Like About Being a Lawyer, 109 YALE L.J. 1443, 1482
(2000) (arguing that the poor would benefit far more from cash transfers than legal services); see also J.J.
Prescott, The Challenges of Calculating the Benefits of Providing Access to Legal Services, 37 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 303, 321 (2010) (suggesting that legal aid resources could be used to “supply low-income individuals with
other benefits, perhaps health care, education, job training, or just cash”). But see DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS
AND HUMAN DIGNITY 94 (2007) (“[L]egal problems often concern rights, and treating people as rights-bearers by
offering legal help dignifies them in a way that treating them as needs-bearers, by offering them cash does
not.”).
9. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Professionalism in Perspective: Alternative Approaches to Nonlawyer
Practice, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 701, 703 (1996); Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to
Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 571 (1994). Whether the legal profession actually holds a
monopoly is much disputed. Compare Jack P. Sahl, Cracks in the Profession’s Monopoly Armor, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2635, 2635 (2014) (“The legal profession in the United States continues to enjoy its long-held monopoly in
the nation’s legal services market. Historically, American courts are largely responsible for this monopoly and
have relied on their ‘[a]ffirmative [i]nherent [p]ower . . . to regulate . . . every aspect of the practice of law.’”),
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justice—the inability of individuals of modest means to obtain legal assistance—is allegedly a direct result of this monopoly.10 As Professor Hadfield has
argued:
The problem of access is primarily a problem of cost—meaning the total cost of
identifying, securing and implementing legal help . . . Under the existing
business model—in which legal services for ordinary individuals are provided
by solo and small firm practitioners in traditional law-office settings—these
costs are simply too high. To reduce the cost of law and increase access to legal
assistance, the form in which legal services are produced and delivered has to
change.11

To expand access to justice, Hadfield and other scholars have urged that the
legal profession should allow large corporations such as Walmart and Google to
enter the legal market.12 These corporations, with their economies of scale and
superior resources, will allegedly be able to provide basic legal services to
currently underserved populations.13 In 2007, the United Kingdom removed
restrictions on non-lawyer ownership of law firms through its so-called Tesco law
in the hope that corporations will succeed where lawyers have failed in
expanding access to justice.14
The American legal profession has historically opposed such proposals on
ethical grounds.15 While some critics view such concerns as a pretext for
economic protectionism,16 others argue that greater non-lawyer involvement in

with Silver & Cross, supra note 8, at 1491 (suggesting that lawyers must compete with other professionals and
do not possess a market monopoly). See also Leslie C. Levin, The Monopoly Myth and Other Tales About the
Superiority of Lawyers, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2611, 2611 (2014) (suggesting that the legal profession’s
monopoly on the practice of law is “under siege”).
10. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, The Cost of Law: Promoting Access to Justice Through the (Un)Corporate
Practice of Law, 38 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ., June 2014, at 43 [hereinafter Hadfield, Cost of Law]; Gillian K.
Hadfield, Innovating to Improve Access: Changing the Way Courts Regulate Legal Markets, 143 Daedalus, no.
3, 2014, at 84-87 [hereinafter Hadfield, Innovating]; Laurel A. Rigertas, The Legal Profession’s Monopoly:
Failing to Protect Consumers, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2683, 2683 (2014); Ray Worthy Campbell, Rethinking
Regulation and Innovation in the U.S. Legal Services Market, 9 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 1, 3 (2012).
11. Hadfield, Cost of Law, supra note 10, at 1, 3.
12. See, e.g., id. at 2; Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services, 73 OHIO ST. L.J.
1, 6 (2012).
13. Knake, supra note 12, at 45.
14. See John Flood, Will There Be Fallout from Clementi? The Repercussions for the Legal Profession After
the Legal Services Act 2007, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 537, 548–49. Tesco is a large grocery chain that some
speculated would dominate the consumer end of the legal market. See id. at 549. However, Tesco does not
currently sell legal services. See Marion Dakers, Tesco Law Rules Relaxed to Encourage More One-Stop Law
Shops, THE TELEGRAPH (Oct. 26, 2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/supportservices/111
87121/Tesco-Law-rules-relaxed-to-encourage-more-one-stop-law-shops.html [http://perma.cc/VKG5-UDPE].
15. See generally Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Pathology, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 75, 84–85 (2012)
(tracing the legal profession’s use of the “idiom of professionalism” to preserve its monopoly from 1920 to the
present day).
16. See, e.g., Knake, supra note 12, at 14 (“That our industry is the only one which attempts—with a
transparent lack of success—to cloak anticompetitive injunctions with the cloth of ‘ethics’ is as humiliating as it
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the legal market could diminish the quality of legal services17 and threaten
attorney independence.18 Moreover, obvious conflicts of interest arise when, as in
the United Kingdom, insurance companies own and operate personal injury firms
or “Walmart lawyers” are able to advise clients on employment law.19 Lawyers
also have a duty to mediate between the interests of their clients and the public,
which may be jeopardized in a liberalized market.20
This Article will contend that, in addition to the ethical issues raised by the
corporate delivery of legal services, its likely impact on access to justice has been
overstated. Although it is undeniable that most people currently do not turn to
lawyers for assistance with the vast majority of their legal problems, this does not
signify that there is a massive unmet demand for legal services that corporations
can fill. Even if corporations could deliver legal services at significantly lower
prices, factors other than cost (such as the public’s lack of understanding of its
legal needs and skepticism about the value of legal assistance) are the main
drivers of lack of access to justice.21 Most legal services are also not prohibitively
expensive,22 and those services that are prohibitively expensive, such as complex
litigation, will likely remain so if corporations were to deliver them.
The legal profession should seek to overcome informational deficiencies that
prevent low- and middle-income Americans from seeking legal assistance. This

is depressing.”) (quoting Bruce MacEwen, et. al., Law Firms, Ethics, and Equity Capital, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 61, 86–87 (2008); George C. Harris & Derek F. Foran, The Ethics of Middle-Class Access to Justice and
What We Can Learn from the Medical Profession’s Shift to a Corporate Paradigm, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 775,
775 (2001) (“All professions are conspiracies against the laity.”) (quoting GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, THE
DOCTOR’S DILEMMA 10 (1963)).
17. See, e.g., Dana Remus, Hemispheres Apart, A Profession Connected, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2665, 2675
(2014); Lisa H. Nicholson, Access to Justice Requires Access to Attorneys: Restrictions on the Practice of Law
Serve a Societal Purpose, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2761, 2768, 2772 (2014).
18. The prohibition against fee-splitting with non-lawyers, for example, is designed to safeguard the
professional independence of the lawyer. See MODEL RULES R. 5.4, cmt. 1; see also Remus, supra note 17, at
2666 (“Without the protections of professional regulation in the corporate hemisphere, the dangers of
insufficient professional independence . . . would be fully realized. There would be little to stop sophisticated
corporate actors from co-opting lawyers into facilitating excessively aggressive or unethical business
schemes.”).
19. See Nick Robinson, When Lawyers Don’t Get All the Profits: Non-Lawyer Ownership, Access and
Professionalism, 29 GEO. J. OF LEGAL ETHICS 1 (2016).
20. See generally W. Bradley Wendel, In Search of Core Values, 16 LEGAL ETHICS 350, 365 (2014) (“The
lawyer’s role is best understood as mediating between the interests of clients and the public interest.
Professionalism . . . refers not to a closed cartel or to the abnegation of the desire to earn a living, but to a
commitment to maintaining the law and related institutions in good working order instead of attempting to game
or subvert it.”). Lawyers, of course, do not always abide by their obligation to exercise independence from their
clients and effectuate compliance with the law as I have noted in two very different contexts. See Milan
Markovic, Subprime Scriveners, 103 KY L.J. 1, 5 (2014); Milan Markovic, Advising Clients After Critical Legal
Studies & the Torture Memos, 114 W.VA. L. REV. 109, 114 (2011).
21. See infra Section II.A.
22. Catherine R. Albiston & Rebecca Sandefur, Expanding the Empirical Study of Access to Justice, 2013
WIS. L. REV. 101, 117 (2013); see also Campbell, supra note 10, at 4 (describing “academic consensus” that
regulation prevents cheaper legal services from being offered in the market).

68

THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS

[Vol. 29:63

could be done by educating the public about its legal needs and loosening ethical
restrictions that inhibit lawyers from soliciting clients and marketing their
services. Nevertheless, low- and middle-income Americans have many types of
needs and merely allowing corporations to enter the legal market will not cause
low- and middle-income people to spend their limited resources on legal
assistance. The focus on satisfying most legal needs with some legal assistance is
not only unrealistic but also counter-productive because it assumes that legal
assistance is valuable in all cases and fails to address the need for high quality
legal services with respect to complex and significant matters.
Part I of this Article briefly reviews the empirical research on unmet legal
needs. Although most of the legal needs of low- and middle-income Americans
are resolved without formal legal assistance, this does not signify that Americans
overwhelmingly desire legal assistance and cannot obtain it. Every legal issue
does not merit the involvement of an attorney.
Part II contests that lack of access to justice is caused by the high cost of legal
services and that legal services are cost- prohibitive. Empirical researchers have
found that individuals do not seek legal assistance because they do not
understand their needs as legal and do not believe that consulting an attorney will
help. Cost is a relatively minor factor. Moreover, although the empirical data on
cost is limited, the cost of basic services such as obtaining a will or uncontested
divorce appears to be quite low. Other legal services, especially those involving
substantial litigation, are quite expensive, but the cost of such services likely
cannot be lowered to the point that they will be affordable for the majority of lowand middle-income individuals and still be delivered ethically, even assuming
that corporations would focus on serving these populations.
Part III suggests that lack of access to justice is likely to persist even if
corporations were permitted to deliver legal services because individuals with
limited discretionary income do not appear to place a high value on legal services
and sometimes act reasonably in handling their legal problems without attorneys.
There is little data to substantiate that legal assistance positively impacts
outcomes, especially with respect to less complex proceedings. In focusing so
heavily on expanding access to justice by providing individuals with some form
of low-cost lawyer or non-lawyer representation, the legal profession may be
confusing its interests with those of low- and middle-income people, who may
not benefit from representation in some situations and are unlikely to receive high
quality representation in situations where legal assistance is critical.
Part IV proposes reforms that can mitigate the lack of access to justice without
removing restrictions on the corporate delivery of legal services. The legal
profession should seek to educate the public about the law and make information
about legal services more readily available, including cost information. Antisolicitation rules and onerous advertising regulations should be reconsidered to
allow attorneys to properly market their services.
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Nevertheless, even with greater awareness of the law, lack of access to justice
will persist because some Americans will be unwilling or unable to pay for legal
services, and there is little apparent support for increased legal aid funding. The
legal profession should consequently target legal aid and pro bono resources
toward complex and significant legal matters that low- and middle-income
people cannot address on their own.

I. UNMET LEGAL NEEDS AND THE DEMAND FOR LEGAL SERVICES
A substantial body of empirical literature examines low- and middle-income
Americans’ legal needs. Although this literature is often used to illustrate that the
legal profession is failing to meet the public’s demand for legal services, its actual
implications are far less clear.
To examine legal needs, researchers generally survey subjects about preselected problems that have a civil law dimension and record whether they sought
or obtained legal assistance in each instance.23 The most recent nationwide
survey was conducted by the American Bar Association (“ABA”) in 1994,
entitled Legal Needs and Civil Justice: A Survey of Americans (“ABA Survey”).24 The ABA Survey found that “nearly three fourths of the legal needs of
low-income households and nearly two thirds of legal needs of moderate-income
households were not taken to the civil justice system.”25 A more recent report by
the Legal Services Corporation concluded that nationwide less than one in five
legal problems are addressed with the assistance of a lawyer.26
Among most scholars and policymakers, it is axiomatic that such statistics
indicate a massive unmet demand for legal services in the United States.27 Such
an analysis fails to appreciate how empirical researchers examine and determine
“legal needs.”
The ABA Survey defines “legal needs” as “specific situations members of
households were dealing with that raised legal issues—whether or not they were
recognized as ‘legal’ or taken to some part of the civil justice system.”28 Most
empirical surveys conceptualize legal needs in the same manner, that is to say,

23. Rebecca L. Sandefur, Moderate Income Households’ Use of Lawyers’ Services, in MIDDLE INCOME
ACCESS TO JUSTICE 224 (Trebilock et al. eds, 2012).
24. See ABA SURVEY, supra note 5, at 1.
25. Id. at 24.
26. LSC REPORT, supra note 5, at 2.
27. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Examining the Real Demand for Legal Services, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 255, 256
(2010) (noting consensus among leading lawyers, scholars, and policymakers on the unmet demand for
affordable legal services).
28. ABA SURVEY, supra note 5, at 2; see also HAZEL GENN, PATHS TO JUSTICE: WHAT PEOPLE DO AND THINK
ABOUT GOING TO LAW 12 (1999) (defining “legal need” as “[a] matter experienced by a respondent which raised
legal issues, whether or not it was recognized by the respondent as being ‘legal’ and whether or not any action
taken by the respondent to deal with the [matter] involved the use of any part of the civil justice system”).
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from the perspective of researchers.29 The justification for adopting a lawyercentric view of “legal needs” is that laymen only have a limited understanding of
when their problems involve a legal component.30
Although this approach allows for a better assessment of the extent to which
the lives of Americans are impacted by legal problems, presumably any qualified
professional or tradesman will detect and identify issues that laymen cannot.31
Not every legal need would benefit from the involvement of a lawyer, and in
some instances, the benefit of legal assistance is extremely low.32 As Professor
Kritzer has explained:
[Figures regarding unmet legal needs] are impressive because of what amounts
to an implicit base of comparison: everyone should always get legal assistance
when a legal problem arises. We would never say that everyone should always
get medical attention when a medical problem arises. We do not go to see a
doctor (or nurse practitioner or physician’s assistant) every time we have a cold
or we stub—and possibly break—a toe . . . We need to put the number of
“unmet legal needs” of any particular group into perspective.33

Expanding access to justice should not require that every dispute with a legal
component—whether it is a dispute between neighbors or a customer and
business—be taken to a lawyer.34
The United States is not unique in having a high incidence of unmet legal
needs.35 Across the developed world people often manage their legal problems

29. See Sandefur, supra note 23, at 224.
30. As Charles Clark and Emma Corstvet observed many years ago, “the usual notion of lawyer is still of a
surgeon, called in for serious operations, or of a witch doctor, to harass the enemy.” Clark & Corstvet, supra
note 1, at 1277.
31. See also Jeffrey Selbin et al., Service Delivery, Resource Allocation, and Access to Justice: Greiner and
Pattanayak and the Research Imperative, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 45, 58 (2014) (“Such studies are undertaken for
the admirable purpose of highlighting the justice gap—the difference between the legal needs of the poor and
our ability to meet them. But as a programmatic matter, they tell us almost nothing about the range of client
needs nor how to allocate existing resources among legal assistance, nonlegal assistance, and other forms of
advice and dispute resolution.”).
32. Measuring demand for legal services via the strain on legal aid offices is similarly problematic because
the demand is skewed by the availability of free assistance. See Kritzer, supra note 27, at 270; see also J. J.
Prescott, The Challenges of Calculating the Benefits of Providing Access to Legal Services, 37 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 303, 304 (2010) (“Public resources are limited, and so the fact that people are ‘in need’ or ‘would benefit
from’ additional [legal aid] funding is not sufficient to justify a shift in the allocation of public monies towards
legal aid.”).
33. Kritzer, supra note 27, at 257.
34. See Luban, supra note 7, at 212 (describing this notion as “nightmarish”).
35. See Laurel S. Terry, Putting the Legal Profession’s Monopoly on the Practice of Law in a Global Context,
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2903, 2937 (2014) (“It does not appear to be accurate to assert . . . that in ‘most
jurisdictions lawyers only enjoy a monopoly over representing clients in courts’ and that ‘[t]he market for legal
services remains largely open.’ . . . In a number of jurisdictions transactional work or ‘advice’ is also a
‘reserved’ legal activity.”) (internal citations omitted).

2016]

JUKING ACCESS TO JUSTICE

71

without attorneys.36 For example, a 2013 United Kingdom survey of a broadly
representative sample of British and Welsh households found that in only thirty
percent of cases did households seek formal legal advice from any source.37 A
2006 New Zealand survey found that ten percent of households obtained
assistance from someone other than a family member or mediator in addressing
their legal problems.38 In Canada, just over eleven percent of “justiciable legal
problems” were taken to attorneys according to a 2007 survey.39
Nor does the high incidence of unmet legal needs reflect that Americans fail to
address their legal problems. The American Bar Foundation’s 2014 Community
Needs and Services Study (“CNSS”) indicates that in only sixteen percent of
situations do people take no action with respect to their civil justice problems.40
In forty-six percent of situations they use self-help, and in twenty-three percent of
situations they obtain assistance from friends and family members.41 The
effectiveness of these strategies or whether they even resolved the needs at issue
can be contested. Yet, contrary to the claims of some commentators, it is
impossible to know whether all of these situations merited attorney involvement
or that respondents were harmed by addressing their needs without attorneys.42

36. Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Fulcrum Point of Equal Access to Justice: Legal and Nonlegal Institutions of
Remedy, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 949, 950 (2009). Of course, it is conceivable that access to justice—and
particularly access to lawyers—is more vital in the United States. See Deborah Rhode, Access to Justice:
Connecting Principles to Practice, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 369, 374 (2004) (“Our poor performance [in access
to justice] is of special concern given the centrality of law and lawyers in American life.”) [hereinafter Rhode,
Connecting Principles to Practice].
37. Nigel Balmer, English and Welsh Civil and Social Justice Panel Survey: Wave 2, iii (2013),
http://doc.ukdataservice.ac.uk/doc/7643/mrdoc/pdf/7643_csjps_wave_two_summary_findings.pdf” http://doc.
ukdataservice.ac.uk/doc/7643/mrdoc/pdf/7643_csjps_wave_two_summary_findings.pdf [perma.cc/B8LU5W35]. Respondents reported seeking formal legal advice from government-funded citizen advice bureaus and
police and not just solicitors. See id. at iii.
38. LEGAL SERVICES AGENCY, NEW ZEALAND’S 2006 NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNMET LEGAL NEEDS AND ACCESS
TO SERVICES 1, 10 (2007), http://www.legalaidreform.org/news/item/download/361_6529f984e7506042975563
1013f26b81 [http://perma.cc/7A76-Z4GW].
39. ABE CURRIE, THE LEGAL PROBLEMS OF EVERYDAY LIFE: THE NATURE, EXTENT AND CONSEQUENCES OF
JUSTICIABLE PROBLEMS EXPERIENCED BY CANADIANS 56 (2007), http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/jsp-sjp/
rr07_la1-rr07_aj1/rr07_la1.pdf [http://perma.cc/6AEW-NTNW] (last visited December 21, 2015).
40. See REBECCA SANDEFUR, ACCESSING JUSTICE IN THE CONTEMPORARY USA: FINDINGS FROM THE
COMMUNITY NEEDS AND SERVICES STUDY 12 (Aug. 8, 2014), http://richardzorza.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/
sandefur-accessing-justice-in-the-contemporary-usa-final.pdf [http://perma.cc/93H9-ZE39] [hereinafter CNSS
Study]. Unlike the ABA Survey, the Community Needs and Services Study did not confine its research to lowand middle-income households. Id. at 5.
41. Id.
42. The LSC Report states, for example, “the long-term goal must be to develop resources sufficient to meet
the civil legal needs of all eligible low-income persons.” LSC REPORT, supra note 5, at 28; see also Hadfield,
Cost of Law, supra note 10, at 5 (noting that it is problematic that households receive less than two hours of help
per surveyed legal need). As Kritzer notes, these assumptions are flawed because unmet legal needs are
calculated against the unrealistic benchmark that all legal needs, no matter how serious, should be resolved
through legal representation. Kritzer, supra note 27, at 257.
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Some of these situations may have benefited from the intervention of an
attorney or a skilled non-attorney.43 But, as set out below, Americans do not seek
legal assistance for a number of different reasons with the cost of assistance
playing a relatively minor role.44

II. HIGH COSTS AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE
The connection between the high cost of legal services and lack of access to
justice is often regarded as self-evident.45 However, empirical research does not
substantiate that lack of access to justice is the product of the high cost of legal
services or that most legal services are especially expensive. Moreover, services
that are truly cost-prohibitive may not be capable of being delivered at
significantly lower prices without adverse consequences to clients and the legal
system.
A. THE ROLE OF COST

Researchers have sought to determine why Americans do not obtain legal
assistance. According to the nationwide ABA Survey completed in 1994
moderate income people fail to take formal legal action in addressing their legal
needs because i) they do not really believe their legal problems are in fact
problems; ii) they prefer to handle their problems on their own; and iii) they
believe that recourse to the legal system would not help.46 The results for
low-income Americans are similar.47 The 2014 CNSS Survey found that forty-six
percent of respondents did not consult lawyers because they did not see the need
and twenty-four percent did not believe that it would help.48 Overall only eight
percent of moderate-income and sixteen percent of low-income respondents cited
cost concerns in explaining their decisions to not seek legal assistance in the ABA
Survey49 whereas cost was a factor in only seventeen percent of instances in
which individuals did not seek legal assistance in the CNSS Survey.50

43. British citizens, for example, are able to consult Citizen Advice Bureaus that are staffed with volunteers.
See Balmer, supra note 37; see also Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply? A Comparative
Assessment of the Legal Resource Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 FORDHAM. URB. L.J. 129, 136 (2009).
44. See infra Part II.
45. See Albiston & Sandefur, supra note 22, at 117 (noting ubiquitous nature of this perception); see also
Gillian Hadfield, Lawyers, Make Room for Non-Lawyers, CNN, (Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/
23/opinion/hadfield-legal-profession [http://perma.cc/TF52-R7SK] (claiming that legal help is “enormously
expensive and out of reach for the vast majority of Americans”).
46. ABA SURVEY, supra note 5, at 22.
47. Low income respondents did identify cost as opposed to desire to handle the problems on their own as a
reason to not seek out formal assistance, however. Id. at 21.
48. See CNSS Study, supra note 40, at 12–13.
49. ABA SURVEY, supra note 5, at 21.
50. See CNSS Study, supra note 40, at 3.
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Recent state surveys are consistent with these findings. For example, in the
legal needs surveys conducted in Virginia and Georgia, cost was not among the
top five reasons that respondents gave for not obtaining legal assistance.51 In
Virginia, 20.5 percent of respondents stated that they did not regard their legal
problems as problems, 17.9 percent did not know why they took no action, 16.8
percent believed that nothing could be done, and 15.1 percent did not want the
hassle.52 In Georgia’s survey, eighteen percent of respondents indicated that they
did not seek help because they did not consider their problems to be legal
problems, 16.7 percent believed that nothing could be done, and 7.5 percent did
not want the hassle.53
These surveys reveal that factors other than cost, such as a lack of
understanding of legal needs and skepticism about the value of legal services, are
the main impediments to expanding access. Americans may be misguided to not
seek legal assistance when they could potentially benefit from it.54 However, the
complex educational, cultural, and psychological barriers that prevent individuals from accessing legal services cannot be overcome merely by increasing the
number of low-cost providers.55
Of course, making legal services more affordable would likely help the subset
of the public that is aware of its legal needs and simply cannot afford to obtain
assistance. The following sections examine the affordability of legal services and
whether corporate delivery of legal services can be expected to lower the price of
legal services that are currently cost-prohibitive.
B. THE AFFORDABILITY OF LEGAL SERVICES

Information about the cost of legal services in the United States is scarce.56 No
comprehensive study has been undertaken to examine what people pay for legal

51. LSC REPORT, supra note 5, at C-1.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Robinson, supra note 19, at 46 (“[S]ome persons who could potentially benefit from legal services
may be resistant to purchasing them . . . either because they do not believe they need a legal service or there are
cultural or psychological barriers to accessing the service.”); see also Albiston & Sandefur, supra note 22, at
117 (“Well-meaning observers often speak and write as though access to justice is only an issue for the poor, and
assume that poor people desire lawyers’ services but cannot obtain them because those services are so very
expensive. In fact, the picture is much more complex.”).
55. Some advocates of corporate delivery of legal services acknowledge this point while contending that
corporate delivery will reduce costs broadly, not merely the price at which services are offered. See Hadfield,
Cost of Law, supra note 10, at 16 (defining cost as “the all-in cost: the final cost of getting the benefit of legal
services . . . . This includes not only the time, research, and educational costs incurred by an attorney . . . . It
includes the cost to the consumer of recognizing the need for and then finding, evaluating, understanding, and
implementing the analysis and recommendation”). For a discussion of how these costs can be addressed without
embracing the corporate delivery of legal services, see infra Part IV.
56. Sandefur, supra note 23, at 227; see also Robinson, supra note 19 (noting absence of reliable cost data in
the United Kingdom, Australia, and United States). But see Hadfield, Cost of Law, supra note 10, at 7
(suggesting on the basis of surveys of the salaries of solo and small firm practitioners that “[c]onventional legal
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services or what attorneys or firms charge for specific services, and more
empirical research is certainly needed in this regard.57 What data there is suggests
that most legal services, outside of litigation, are modestly priced.58
Professor Sandefur calculated the cost of several common legal services based
on a late 1980s survey of lawyers’ charges and adjusted the figures to today’s
dollars.59 For a will, assuming no discounting, Sandefur estimates the average
cost to be from $139 to $201.60 Sandefur estimates the cost for a real estate
closing to be $731–$1,056.61 The same methodology indicates that the cost of an
uncontested divorce is $848–$1,225.62 While these sums may seem high, by way
of comparison, the average American family spends significantly more on eating
out at restaurants ($2,600) and entertainment ($2,700).63
Sandefur’s fee estimates are not definitive.64 Nevertheless, they are consistent
with surveys undertaken in similar legal jurisdictions such as Canada.65 That
most basic legal services are relatively affordable stands to reason because solo
practitioners and small firms must compete intensely over price.66 Additional
downward pressure on prices in the United States has also come in recent years
from the oversupply of new attorneys.67

services are simply beyond the means of most Americans”). While various publications do release data on
hourly billing rates, not all services are billed by the hour and lawyers routinely discount their hourly rates. See
generally Robert E. Hirshon, The Billable Hour is Dead: Long Live?, 30 GP SOLO MAG., Jan./Feb. 2013, at 22,
25 (“[T]he billable hour no longer rules the kingdom alone.”).
57. Sandefur, supra note 23, at 227.
58. See David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 92 (1983)
(suggesting that legal fees are modest for justice problems that do not involve filing a lawsuit); Sandefur, supra
note 23, at 229.
59. See Sandefur, supra note 23, at 228–29. Professor Sandefur also compared these figures against those
provided by CostHelper, a website that receives cost data from both consumers and providers who visit the
website. See id. at 229.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See id.
63. Sandefur, supra note 23, at 229 (internal citation omitted).
64. Sandefur acknowledges, “we know little about how much individuals who buy lawyers’ services today
typically pay for them.” Id. at 231.
65. Canadian Lawyer Magazine’s survey of legal fees suggests that the average cost in Canada for a real
estate sale is $696, $853 for a real estate purchase, $370 for a basic will, $1169 for an uncontested divorce. See
Michael McKiernan, The Going Rate, CAN. LAWYER MAG., June 2014, at 35, http://www.canadianlawyermag.
com/images/stories/pdfs/Surveys/2014/cljune14legalfees.pdf [http://perma.cc/FJ5V-LVT3].
66. See, e.g., Leslie C. Levin, Preliminary Reflections on the Professional Development of Solo and Small
Firm Practitioners, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 847, 848 (2001); Richard L. Abel, The Transformation of the
American Legal Profession, 20 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 7, 13 (1986); see also Silver & Cross, supra note 8, at 1490
(“Both within the bar and between the bar and parallel professions, competition for business is fierce.”).
Hadfield acknowledges this competition and yet postulates that prices can nevertheless be substantially reduced.
See Hadfield, Cost of Law, supra note 10, at 16–17.
67. American law schools have been graduating approximately two students for every available legal job for
the last several years. See Katherine Mangan, Law Deans Confront a ‘New Normal’ as Schools Adjust to
Job-Market Changes, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 18, 2013, at A3. Some have speculated that there is not an
oversupply of new lawyers because the needs of low- and middle-income individuals continue to go unmet. See,
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Of course, as indicated by legal needs studies, a substantial number of
Americans doubt that they can afford legal assistance.68 However, these studies
do not provide respondents with information about fees charged by attorneys in
their jurisdictions or ascertain whether the respondents had previously retained
lawyers.69 Clients are often satisfied with the fees they have paid to attorneys
despite the public’s general perception that lawyers charge too much.70
This is not to deny that some legal services are prohibitively expensive.
Litigation can cost tens of thousands of dollars in the United States,71 and many
lawyers do not take cases on a contingent fee basis.72 Nevertheless, as set out
below, these legal services likely cannot be provided at significantly lower prices
even assuming that corporations would seek to offer them.
C. LOWERING COSTS THROUGH NON-LAWYER DELIVERY OF LEGAL
SERVICES?

Scholars critical of the legal profession’s monopoly over the legal services
market have acknowledged the existence of substantial competition in the legal
market while claiming that non-lawyer-owned firms would be able to make legal
services more affordable through greater economies of scale and better use of
technology.73 Under this view, while legal services have traditionally been

e.g., ILL. STATE BAR ASS’N, FINAL REPORT, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS THE IMPACT OF LAW SCHOOL DEBT
ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES (2013), http://www.isba.org/sites/default/files/committees/ISBA%20Law%
20School%20Debt%20Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/ARU9-5RKN]. However, this presupposes that low- and
middle-income individuals are willing and able to pay for legal services. See Bernie Burke, Still More on What
Matters Most, THE FACULTY LOUNGE (Jan. 13, 2013), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2013/01/still-more-onwhat-matters-most-or-a-guided-tour-of-pandaemonium.html [http://perma.cc/UY4J-Y7UB] (“If you think that
every underemployed law graduate in America is just too lazy, too stupid or too greedy to take one of the
countless paying jobs just waiting out there to meet the legal needs of the poor (who have no money to pay you,
despite their substantial and serious needs), you live in a fantasy world.”).
68. See ABA SURVEY, supra note 5.
69. See Sandefur, supra note 23, at 227 (“No major contemporary survey asks Americans how much they
paid for lawyers’ services to handle a specific justice problem . . . .”). Some respondents who are concerned
about cost may in fact qualify for legal aid because most Americans who qualify for legal aid do not recognize it.
See LSC REPORT, supra note 5, at D-1 (summarizing knowledge of legal aid from state surveys).
70. Sandefur, supra note 23, at 232 (citations omitted). In one survey conducted in Chicago, sixty-two
percent of respondents claimed to be “very satisfied” with the cost of their legal services. Id. (citation omitted);
see also Law Society of Alberta, Most Albertans Satisfied with their Lawyers: Ipsos Reid Poll Shows, May 19,
2010, http://www.lawsociety.ab.ca/files/bulletins/Bulletin_2010_05May_19.htm [http://perma.cc/CMW5-2Q4
2] (noting that seventy-one percent of surveyed respondents claimed to receive either very good value or good
value from their lawyers).
71. See Sandefur, supra note 23, at 230 (“Especially when substantial litigation is involved, as in the case of
contested divorces, legal services can be quite costly, running into the tens of thousands of dollars.”). But see id.
(noting that over half of litigants appear to be charged less than $5000). The average cost for a lawyer to handle
a two-day trial in Canada is estimated to be $21,953. McKiernan, supra note 65.
72. Contingent fees are not permitted in criminal and matrimonial matters. See MODEL RULES R. 1.5(d)
(1) –(2).
73. See Hadfield, supra note 10, at 18; RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S LAWYERS 57 (2013) [hereinafter
SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S LAWYERS]; Campbell, supra note 10, at 3; see also Alexander Schwab, Note, In
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delivered in a “bespoke manner,”74 as with other industries, more and more work
that was once bespoke can be “commoditized, masse produced, and sold at a
much, much lower cost.”75 Whatever the future of the legal market, this belief
that corporations will succeed where lawyers have failed in delivering legal
services to low-and-middle income people rests on a number of unexamined
assumptions. Corporations may not necessarily be more innovative than lawyerowned firms, they may choose to focus on areas that are already highly profitable,
and cannot easily commoditize litigation and other services that are currently
cost-prohibitive.
As a preliminary matter, it is unclear why lawyer-owned firms cannot deliver
commoditized services. It is true that corporations—particularly public corporations—can fund their activities more easily than lawyer-owned firms.76 But there
is no a priori reason to believe that corporations are more efficient and innovative
than other business entities or that they can make formerly unprofitable legal
practice areas profitable.77
According to research conducted by Harvard Law School’s Program on the
Legal Profession in 2014, jurisdictions that have liberalized their legal markets
have been unable to find a discernable impact on access to justice.78 This reflects
not only the difficulty in delivering legal services to low- and middle-income
clients profitably but also that non-lawyer-owned firms are more likely to

Defense of Ambulance Chasing: A Critique of Model Rules of Professional Conduct 7.3, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 603, 624 (2011) (“A smaller practice cannot expect the constant stream of clients a high-volume firm
enjoys.”).
74. See RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? (2010) (describing bespoke legal services as “one-to-one
consultative professional service, highly tailored for the specific needs of particular clients”).
75. Benjamin Barton, The Lawyer’s Monopoly—What Goes and What Stays, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3067,
3070 (2014).
76. See EDWARD IAOBUCCI & MICHAEL TREBILOCK, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE BUSINESS
STRUCTURES FOR THE PRACTICE OF LAW 53 (Sept. 20, 2013), http://www.lsuc.on.ca/uploadedFiles/ABS-report-I
acobucci-Trebilcock-september-2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/8G9E-5LG7]. (“Outside shareholders may provide
capital to the firm that would be very difficult to raise from capital-constrained professionals within the firm, or
from banks.”). It bears noting, however, that the vast majority of corporations are not public corporations and
cannot readily access the capital markets. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close
Corporations & Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 271 (1986) (“[I]nvestors in closely held corporations have
large percentages of their wealth tied up in one firm and lack access to capital markets. Thus they are less
efficient risk bearers than investors in publicly held corporations.”).
77. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER DECKER & GEORGE YARROW, UNDERSTANDING THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR
LEGAL SERVICES REGULATION 55 (Oct. 31, 2010), http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news_publications/latest_
news/pdf/economic_rationale_for_Legal_Services_Regulation_Final.pdf [http://perma.cc/AJW3-RLYG] (“Economic analysis does not provide any clear-cut, a priori, answers to the question of what is the most efficient way
to bundle economic activities.”); Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism and Process of Creative Destruction, in
MONOPOLY POWER AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 19, 31–35 (Edwin Mansfield ed., 1974) (claiming that market
control facilitates innovation by freeing business decision-making from a focus on the short term); cf. Mark
Zachary Taylor, Empirical Evidence Against Varieties of Capitalism’s Theory of Technological Innovation, 58
INT’L ORG. 601, 628 (2004) (suggesting that countries with more regulated economies are no less innovative
than freer economies).
78. See Robinson, supra note 19 at 6.
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gravitate to high margin contingency work rather than seeking to innovate in
areas that are currently unprofitable.79
Indeed, rather than expanding access to legal services, corporations may
simply compete for existing legal work.80 The United States does not permit
non-lawyer-owned firms to provide legal services, but LegalZoom, an online
provider of customizable legal documents such as wills, has grown rapidly and
developed a large customer base.81 LegalZoom’s success has apparently not,
however, led individuals to acquire wills in greater numbers.82 Clients may
benefit from increased competition in the legal market,83 but access to justice is
hardly advanced by the migration of work from lawyer-owned firms to other
entities.
Even accepting that non-lawyer-owned firms can deliver legal services more
efficiently and that these firms will focus on providing services to those who are
underserved in the current market, much legal work requires individual attention
and cannot be commoditized.84 Litigation is the quintessential bespoke service,85
79. Id. at [INSERTPAGE] (“Non-lawyer ownership is likely to be attracted to sectors where expected returns
to profit are high . . . like personal injury . . . other sectors of legal services have not witnessed as largest
investment by non-lawyers.”). For example, Slater & Gordon (“S&G”), Australia’s first publicly traded law
firm, predominately focuses on highly lucrative personal injury work and has grown by acquiring established
personal injury firms. See Thomas Markle, Note, A Call to Partner with Outside Capital: The Non-Lawyer
Investment Approach Must Be Updated, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1251, 1267-68 (2013). S&G has a natural advantage
over its lawyer-owned competitors because its principals are not required to fund cases themselves. See also
Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, Law Firms on the Big Board?: A Proposal for Nonlawyer Investment in
Law Firms, 86. CAL. L. REV. 1, 34–45 (1998) (“Because [a] plaintiffs’ firm lacks access to outside capital, it can
only fund a limited number of cases on a contingency fee basis at any one time . . . Allowing nonlawyer
investment in law firms would permit greater risk sharing in contingency fee cases.”).
80. The potential macroeconomic effects of non-lawyer ownership of personal injury firms should not be
overlooked. Such ownership could lead to an increase in frivolous or speculative lawsuits because lawyers no
longer bear the entire risk of failure. Cf. Stuart L. Pardau, Alternative Litigation Financing: Perils and
Opportunities, 12 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 65, 82 (noting these concerns with respect to litigation financing). Of
course, unlike litigation financing, where investors fund a discrete case and obtain access to case materials, see
id. at 72, investors in law firms will presumably not have access to all of a firm’s case records and therefore less
ability to determine investment risk.
81. See Carolyn Elefant, The LegalZoom IPO: Proving that Volume Practice Doesn’t Work, Even 21st
Century Style, MYSHINGLE.COM (July 30, 2012), http://myshingle.com/2012/07/articles/trends/the-legalzoomipo-proving-that-volume-practice-doesnt-work-even-21st-century-style/ [http://perma.cc/YK3U-3BNS] (describing LegalZoom’s business model).
82. See Robinson, supra note 19, at 38-39 (summarizing research in Massachusetts).
83. Although beyond the scope of this Article, some commentators maintain that there are benefits to
lowering the cost of legal services aside from expanding access to justice. See generally Benjamin H. Barton, A
Glass Half-Full Look at the Changes in the Legal Market, 38 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 29, 36 (2014) (“The
argument that we will be better off with cheaper access to legal work is thus a simple Coasian syllogism: (1)
markets work better and we are all better off when transaction costs are lower; (2) legal fees are transaction
costs; (3) we are all better off when legal fees are cheaper.”).
84. Legal futurists have acknowledged that technology will be unable to replace oral advocates for the
foreseeable future. See SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S LAWYERS, supra note 74, at 58; Robinson, supra note 19, at 45
(“Much legal work . . . requires the individualized attention of an experienced practitioner who often charges
high rates.”).
85. SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S LAWYERS, supra note 74, at 58.
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and to make litigation affordable for low- and middle-class individuals while still
remaining profitable, non-lawyer-owned firms would likely have to handle a
greater number of cases. However, it is difficult to conduct a high volume
litigation practice in accordance with ethical rules.86 The recent American
experience with foreclosure firms is especially concerning.87 Under pressure to
minimize litigation costs and handle a surge in foreclosure cases, partners
devoted little time to individual cases and largely abdicated their pre-trial
responsibilities to support staffs.88 Principals in some of the most profitable
foreclosure firms were ultimately sanctioned for filing documents that they knew
or should have known were false as well as for outright fraud.89
One possible means to make litigation less expensive while avoiding such
excesses is to permit lay advocates in a greater range of proceedings.90 A few
jurisdictions are already experimenting with licensed, non-lawyer representatives.91 These initiatives may well be worth pursuing, especially with respect to
proceedings where litigants overwhelmingly appear unrepresented.92 However, it
86. For a powerful account of high volume legal practice in the immigration law context, see RICHARD ABEL,
LAWYERS IN THE DOCK 105–108 (2008) (describing a disciplinary case involving an attorney in New York’s
Chinatown with over 500 cases pending before the immigration courts). Nora Engstrom has written of high
volume settlement mills: “[Clients] who have meritorious claims and have been seriously injured are least apt to
benefit from this unique brand of legal service, raising profound ethical and public policy issues.” Nora Freeman
Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1485, 1547 (2009); see also Schwab, supra note
73, at 625 (“The high-volume model is not best equipped to handle complex cases requiring individualized
attention or serious matters where minor errors could have major repercussions.”); cf. Carolyn Elefant, The
LegalZoom IPO: Proving that Volume Practice Doesn’t Work, Even 21st Century Style, MYSHINGLE.COM (July
30, 2012), http://myshingle.com/2012/07/articles/trends/the-legalzoom-ipo-proving-that-volume-practice-doesntwork-even-21st-century-style/#sthash.jzjWjNmP.dpuf [http://perma.cc/YK3U-3BNS] (“Even with all of the
technology in the world, with a volume practice, you’re always on the prowl to drum up more clients to feed the
beast. That’s partly because volume practice requires bodies to serve, but also because volume work consists
largely of ‘one-off’s’ . . . so you can’t leverage your existing marketing efforts.”).
87. The recent economic recession saw the rise of massive foreclosure firms that would handle hundreds of
cases simultaneously on behalf of their financial institution clients. See, e.g., James Geoffrey Durham, Avoiding
a Lawyers’ Race to the Foreclosure Bottom: Some Advice for Lenders and Borrowers on their Role in
Foreclosure Litigation, 32 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 419, 420 (2012); Dustin A. Zacks, Robo-Litigation, 60 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 867, 868 (2013). See id. at 901–04; see also id. at 884–90 (examining cases from Florida and other states).
88. Id. at 898.
89. See id. at 884–90 (examining cases from Florida and other states).
90. See, e.g., Richard Zorza & David Udell, New Roles for Non-Lawyers to Increase Access to Justice, 41
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1259, 1274 (2014); Deborah L. Rhode, The Delivery of Legal Services by Non-Lawyers, 4
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 209, 230 (1990).
91. Washington State licenses “legal technicians,” although they currently do not have the ability to
represent litigants in court. See Brooks Holland, The Washington State Limited License Legal Technician
Practice Rule: A National First in Access to Justice, 82 MISS. L.J. 75, 95 (2013). Research also indicates that lay
advocates may perform as well as lawyers in certain types of proceedings. See HERBERT M. KRITZER, LEGAL
ADVOCACY: LAWYERS AND NONLAWYERS AT WORK 77, 118–19, 171 (1998) (examining performance in
unemployment compensation appeals, state labor board appeals and social security disability appeals); see also
Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Impact of Counsel: An Analysis of Empirical Evidence, 9 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 51, 74
(2010) (suggesting that the importance of attorneys increases as procedural complexity increases).
92. Ontario allows licensed paralegals to appear in court with respect to small claims and administrative
matters. See Law Society of Upper Canada, By-Law 4 §6(2)(2).
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is unclear that non-lawyers, whether they work on their own or for corporations,
will be able to afford to substantially undercut their lawyer competitors on price
and still maintain profitable practices.93
Litigation is labor-intensive and presumably non-lawyers will need to prepare
cases in much the same way that lawyers do. Even a relatively simple matter such
as the defense of a tenant in a summary eviction proceeding requires a
representative to i) obtain and review all of the documents relevant to the tenancy
and visit the property in question; ii) determine whether the landlord has used the
correct procedure for eviction under state and local laws; and iii) investigate
potential defenses such as that the landlord failed to maintain the premises or had
a retaliatory or discriminatory motive for bringing the eviction.94 Non-lawyers
will also have many of the same costs as lawyers, ranging from office expenses to
educational costs and professional dues.95
The United States already allows non-lawyers to represent individuals before
certain administrative agencies.96 For example, non-lawyers routinely represent
claimants in social security disability appeals.97 The involvement of non-lawyers
has not led to lower fees in social security cases, and firms that employ
non-lawyers to handle appeals have been roundly criticized for ethical lapses.98

93. This point seems to be conceded by some advocates of lay practice, see Zorza & Udell, supra note 90, at
1307, although they claim that costs can eventually be lowered. Id. at 1308.
94. Lawrence Wood, Keeping Tenants Out of the Cold, Local State and Federal Laws Offer Defenses Against
Eviction Actions, 84 ABA J. 68 (1998).
95. A study comparing rates of lawyers and non-lawyers who contracted with the British government to
provide legal aid found that solicitors charged hourly rates that were only $7.50 higher than those of
non-lawyers. See Richard Moorehead et al., Contesting Professionalism: Legal Aid and Nonlawyers in England
and Wales, 37 L. & SOC’Y REV. 765, 783 (2003). Interestingly, the study found that lawyers ultimately charged
less than non-lawyers because they devoted fewer hours to their matters. See id. As the authors acknowledge,
however, because of the design of the legal aid scheme, lawyers had incentives to devote less time to their legal
aid cases whereas non-lawyers had incentives to devote more time per case. See id. at 783–4.
96. See generally Zachary Zurek, Comment, The Limited Power of the Bar to Protect Its Monopoly, 3 ST.
MARY’S J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 242, 261 n.98 (2013) (noting that non-lawyers are authorized to represent
individuals before the Social Security Administration, Department of Labor, Patent and Trademark Office, and
other administrative agencies).
97. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1705 (recognizing that claimants may retain non-attorney representatives). The
social security system is allegedly the largest adjudicatory system in the world. See Robert E. Rains,
Professional Responsibility and Social Security Representation: The Myth of the State-Bar Compliance with
Federal Rules on Production on Adverse Evidence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 363, 364 (citing Heckler v. Campbell,
461 U.S. 458, 461 n.2 (1983)).
98. Binder & Binder, a firm partly owned by non-lawyers, has been employing lay advocates to handle social
security claims since 2004 when the Social Security Administration amended its representation rules. See
Damian Paletta & Dionne Searcey, Two Lawyers Strike Gold in U.S. Disability System, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 22,
2011), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203518404577096632862007046 [http://perma.cc/3K
3G-NU93]. Binder & Binder is highly profitable because it charges fees that are the same as its lawyer-owned
competitors while functioning largely as a “warehouse” for claims. See id. It is generally viewed as responsible
for diminishing the ethics of the social security bar generally. See Robinson, supra note 19, at 50. Non-lawyer
representatives are also sanctioned at a higher rate than lawyer representatives. See Drew A. Swank, Money for
Nothing: Five Small Steps to Begin the Journey of Restoring Integrity to the Social Security Administration’s
Disability Programs, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 155, 173 (2012).
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Foreclosure and social security firms may be anomalies. But these examples
illustrate that the commodification of litigation and other complex services is
difficult to achieve without compromising ethics, no matter the capitalization of
the entity that delivers them. Rather than transforming how legal services are
delivered, corporations may simply bring ethically problematic high-volume
legal practice to more sectors of the legal market.99 Regulating these entities, as
has been done in the United Kingdom, could help to prevent an ethical race-to-the
bottom, but the end result may simply be that legal work moves from lawyers to
non-lawyers without expanding access to justice.
Although more empirical research must be undertaken, there is little evidence
to support the view that the high cost of legal services is responsible for the high
incidence of unmet legal needs. Nor will the corporate delivery of legal services,
either through lawyers or non-lawyers, be able to render cost-prohibitive services
such as litigation affordable without significantly diminishing the quality of
representation provided.

III. THE PRIORITIZATION OF LEGAL ASSISTANCE
The notion that corporations will expand access to justice by lowering the cost
of legal services also presupposes that people prioritize legal services and would
purchase them if they were significantly less expensive. However, low- and
middle-income people have limited resources. Satisfying legal needs often means
forsaking other needs. Depending on the nature of the legal problem, low- and
middle-income people may reasonably choose to handle their legal problems on
their own.100 In assuming that most, if not all, problems with a legal component
should be addressed via some type of legal representation, the legal profession
potentially overstates the importance and value of legal assistance.
A. DO LOW- AND MIDDLE-INCOME AMERICANS PRIORITIZE LEGAL
SERVICES?

One of the chief reasons that Americans might reasonably choose to handle
their legal problems on their own is that they prefer to spend their limited funds
99. Cf. ABEL, supra note 86, at 107–08 (quoting an attorney who defended himself in disciplinary proceeding
by stating, “I’m the only low budget lawyer in Chinatown . . . I’m Filene’s basement . . . This is Lord & Taylor
trying to put Filene’s basement out of business” (internal citation omitted)).
100. The prevailing view appears to be that unrepresented individuals are bereft of volition. See, e.g., TASK
FORCE TO EXPAND ACCESS TO CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES IN N.Y., REPORT TO CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
1, 12 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 NY REPORT]; LSC REPORT, supra note 5, at 24 (suggesting that unrepresented
individuals have no choice but to be unrepresented); see also Russell Engler, Ethics in Transition:
Unrepresented Litigants and the Changing Judicial Role, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 367, 386
(2010) (“A litigant’s appearance without counsel is most often compelled, not voluntary.”). Another common
view is that the unrepresented are fools, as reflected by the well-known legal maxim: A man who chooses to
represent himself has a fool for a client. See also Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 438 (1991) (“A lawyer who
represents himself has a fool for a client.”).
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on other goods and services. Attorney use is directly linked with income.101 The
modern single-earner family has experienced a seventy-two percent drop in
discretionary income from a generation ago; low- and increasingly middleincome individuals cannot readily satisfy their legal needs without ignoring other
needs.102 That the average poor person spends far more money on food, health
care, shelter, clothing, education, entertainment, transportation, and alcohol than
he or she does on legal services also evinces that legal services are a low
priority.103
The spending of low- and middle-income people may fail to reflect their true
priorities if, for example, they do not know that their problems are legal in nature
or do not believe they can find affordable legal assistance.104 Moreover, it is
difficult to conceive of the decision to represent oneself as a choice when
ninety-eight percent of tenants in eviction cases, ninety-nine percent of borrowers
in consumer credit cases, and ninety-five percent of parents in child support
cases, appear unrepresented in court, as is the case in New York State.105
The legal profession should certainly do more to educate the public about the
importance and availability of legal services.106 Nevertheless, even with full
information, many individuals may reasonably choose to handle their legal
problems on their own. According to the 1994 ABA Survey, forty-eight percent of
101. See Balmer, supra note 37, at 49 (summarizing research). The evidence is less clear that this is a result
of money or the type of problems that wealthier people experience versus poor ones. Compare id. at 48
(suggesting that lawyer use is linked with income even when controlling for problem type), with Kritzer, supra
note 27, at 259 (“Some of the overall difference in lawyer use as a function of income reflects the different types
of problems those with lower incomes frequently experience, as compared to those with higher incomes.”).
102. Elizabeth Warren, The Middle Class on the Precipice: Rising Financial Risks for American Families,
HARV. MAG., Jan.–Feb. 2006, http://harvardmagazine.com/2006/01/the-middle-class-on-the-html [http://perma.
cc/94VJ-3NQ4]; see also Anna Bernasek, The Typical Household, Now Worth a Third Less, N.Y. TIMES (July
26, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/27/business/the-typical-household-now-worth-a-third-less.html?_
r⫽0 [https://perma.cc/EF5V-2D9F?type⫽source] (noting that the inflation-adjusted median net worth of
American households fell from $87,992 in 2003 to $56,335 in 2013).
103. Silver & Cross, supra note 8, at 1487; see also Robert Nelson, the Future of American Lawyers: A
Demographic Profile of a Changing Profession in a Changing Society, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 345, 382 (1994)
(“[L]egal services may not be as high a priority for the poor as employment, medical care, food, or shelter.”).
Although one may question whether money spent on entertainment or alcohol would better go to obtaining legal
advice, there is obviously significant risk for lawyers and policymakers to substitute their values for those that
they are purportedly trying to help. See Silver & Cross, supra note 8, at 1483 (“As a class, poor people are
needy, not incompetent. If they value television sets, clothing, legal services or healthcare differently than we
do, the appropriate presumption is that they know what is best for them.”).
104. Many people also likely overestimate their ability to handle their legal problems on their own. See
Justin Kruger & David Dunning, Unskilled and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in Recognizing One’s Own
Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1121, 1130 (1999)
(“Incompetence . . . not only causes poor performance but also the inability to recognize that one’s performance
is poor.”).
105. 2010 NY REPORT, supra note 100, at 1; Jonathan Lippman, New York’s Template to Address the Crisis in
Civil Legal Services, 7 HARV. L & POL’Y REV. 13, 13 (2013); see also DC Report, supra note 5, at 132, 133
(noting that 98.65 percent of respondents in paternity and child support cases and 97.75 percent of respondents
in housing court were pro se in 2005).
106. See infra Part IV.
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low-income households and sixty-four percent of moderate-income households
are satisfied with the resolution of their legal needs when they retain an
attorney.107 This stands to reason because even the most skilled attorney cannot
ensure a positive outcome. Retaining an attorney, as opposed to engaging in
self-help or seeking help from a knowledgeable friend or family member, may
increase the likelihood of a positive outcome but not to the extent that it justifies
the added cost.108
Indeed, although commentators often view self-representation rates in eviction, consumer debt, and other proceedings involving unpaid financial obligations as compelling evidence of a lack of access to justice,109 any funds expended
by litigants for legal assistance could instead be used to satisfy a portion of their
unpaid obligations.110 Although retention of counsel may diminish any liabilities,
effective representation can be very expensive and not even the best attorney can
guarantee the desired result.111 Representing oneself could even constitute a
strategic choice.112 Judges and court staffs are often forced to assist the
unrepresented in navigating the legal process.113
Were the unrepresented merely victims of their financial circumstances,114
representation rates should not differ based on the legal problem at issue. Yet,
Americans are far more likely to consult attorneys with respect to divorce and

107. ABA SURVEY, supra note 5, at 29.
108. See id. (setting out varying satisfaction rates based on whether respondents took no action, handled the
situation themselves, sought assistance from a non-legal third party, or retained counsel). Satisfaction also
depended greatly on the nature of the legal problem. See id.
109. See, e.g., Hadfield, Innovating, supra note 10, at 1; Lippman, supra note 105, at 13; LSC REPORT, supra
note 5, at 25.
110. According to a 2005 study, eighty-three percent of unrepresented litigants in New York’s housing courts
make less than $30,000 a year. LSC REPORT, supra note 5, at 25; see also Robinson, supra note 19, at 45
(“Non-lawyer ownership provides few new options for a bankrupt tenant facing eviction.”).
111. Unfortunately, not all legal representation is effective. For example, a recent report on the New York
Immigration Courts found that nearly half of legal representatives provided inadequate representation, with the
private bar providing significantly worse representation than legal clinics and pro bono attorneys. See STUDY
GROUP ON IMMIGRANT REPRESENTATION, ACCESSING JUSTICE: THE AVAILABILITY AND ADEQUACY OF COUNSEL IN
IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS 1, 4, 26 (2011), http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/denovo/NYIRS_Report.
pdf [http://perma.cc/4UPQ-DBVX].
112. Cf. Engler, supra note 100, at 396 (noting the perception that some unrepresented litigants are seeking
“free lunch” or otherwise seeking to gain an advantage by representing themselves, even where they might have
the means to pay for counsel). One study of divorce courts in Maricopa County, Arizona found that seventy-two
percent of self-represented litigants would represent themselves in future divorce cases. See Bruce D. Sales et
al., Is Self-Representation a Reasonable Alternative to Attorney Representation in Divorce Cases, 37 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 553, 561, 604 (1994).
113. See 2010 NY REPORT, supra note 100, at 12 (“When parties appear without counsel the important role of
the judge as a neutral arbiter is increasingly difficult to maintain.”); see also Russell G. Pearce, Redressing
Inequality in the Market for Justice: Why Access to Lawyers Will Never Solve the Problem and Rethinking the
Role of Judges Will Help, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 969, 975–76 (2004) (summarizing research on judges’
obligations to assist unrepresented litigants).
114. See ABA SURVEY, supra note 5.
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custody than other civil justice problems.115 A 2008 District of Columbia report
found that thirty-eight percent of respondents in divorce cases and custody cases
were pro se compared to ninety-seven percent of respondents in housing court.116
Individuals make judgments, however imperfectly, about when it is actually
necessary and advantageous to hire an attorney.117
Despite the attention devoted to expanding access to justice, as set out below,
there is surprisingly little empirical research to suggest that the public would
benefit from legal assistance in a much larger range of matters.
B. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LEGAL ASSISTANCE

Access to justice advocates have long contended that “legal representation
makes all the difference.”118 Yet very little reliable research supports this
position.119 As Professor Levin has noted about existing studies that purport to
measure the importance of legal representation:
The problem with [the existing studies] is that a simple comparison of the
outcomes in cases where a client is represented by a lawyer and where an
individual self-represents cannot account for other factors that may affect
outcomes, including factors that affect whether a client will obtain a lawyer.
For instance, the ability to obtain legal representation may depend upon the
individual’s perseverance or articulateness or other characteristics that may
also be relevant to case outcomes. The ability to obtain counsel may also
depend upon the strength of the client’s case, which may affect whether
a . . . lawyer would take the case . . . .120

Two recent, more rigorous studies have questioned whether legal assistance
even marginally increases the likelihood of a positive outcome. Professors
Greiner and Pattanayak analyzed the outcomes of claimants in unemployment
benefits appeals who were unrepresented versus those who were randomly

115. See Sandefur, supra note 23, at 238–39.
116. DC REPORT, supra note 5, at 7, 9.
117. See Sandefur, supra note 23, at 237 (noting that Americans are more likely to obtain lawyers when there
is no means to readily resolve their problems other than going to court); see also Judith G. McMullen & Debra
Oswald, Why Do We Need a Lawyer? An Empirical Study of Divorce Cases, 12 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 57, 59 (2010)
(“[Pro se] divorce litigants may have good, common sense notions about when self-representation is feasible
and when it is not.”). An ABA survey found that twenty percent of pro se litigants in family courts admitted that
they could afford an attorney. Id. at 58, n.4.
118. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance: What
Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118, 2181 (2012) [hereinafter
Greiner & Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation].
119. See, e.g., id. at 2119; Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding
and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 991 (2012) (“[T]here seems to be little benefit to providing
lawyers across the board, especially in simple cases.”).
120. Levin, supra note 9, at 2617–18 (citations omitted).
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assigned representation by the Harvard Legal Aid Bureau in 2012.121 Despite the
excellent reputation of the Bureau and the best efforts of its students and staff,122
claimants who received an offer to be represented by the Bureau did not win at a
significantly higher rate than those who did not.123
A 2009 study by Erica Hashimoto of federal criminal misdemeanor cases
concluded that representation not only provided little benefit but also produced
worse outcomes.124 The study compared the outcomes of pro se defendants with
those of defendants who either retained counsel or had counsel appointed.125 Pro
se litigants were acquitted and had their cases dismissed at significantly higher
rates than their represented peers.126 They also received lighter sentences.127 The
study controlled both for the severity of the charges and the type of offenses,
although defendants who represented themselves could, conceivably, have had
stronger cases than those who retained or were assigned representation.128
These results should be taken with caution. Other randomized studies have
found that legal representation does positively affect outcomes.129 Moreover,
unemployment benefits cases and misdemeanor criminal cases generally do not
allow for a great deal of preparation time, potentially making counsel less useful
than in matters where attorneys have additional time.130 Representation may also
benefit clients in ways other than affecting outcomes in individual cases.131

121. See Greiner & Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation, supra note 118, at 2140, 2143.
122. See id. at 2141.
123. See id. at 2149.
124. See Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 461, 489
(2009).
125. See id. at 490.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 495.
129. See James Greiner et al., The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance: A Randomized Study in
Massachusetts District Court and Prospects for the Future, 126 HARV. L. REV. 901, 928 (2013); Carroll Seron
et al., The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor Tenants in New York City’s Housing Court: Results of
a Randomized Experiment, 35 L. & SOC’Y REV. 419, 421 (2001).
130. See Greiner & Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation, supra note 116, at 2171–72 (suggesting that the
quick time frame for employment appeals may explain their findings). A subsequent study by Greiner and
Pattanayak in housing court seems to suggest the superiority of traditional legal assistance over limited scope or
unbundled legal assistance. See James Greiner et al., supra note 129, at 903–04 (noting that represented
individuals were more likely to remain in their homes and have their financial obligations reduced). The authors
speculate that this may be due to, inter alia, the relatively complex nature of housing law, the litigation style of
the attorneys, and the relatively limited time of the judges to conduct their own inquiries. See id. at 940–44.
131. As Greiner and Pattanayak suggest:
[R]epresentation may assure that each person subject to official decision-making and/or state coercive
power is treated with dignity; it may promote a feeling on the part of the litigant that the process was
fair and that her story was told, thereby increasing the litigant’s willingness to accept the result of the
adjudication . . . . It may educate the client as to her best interests or as to what is possible given legal
and factual constraints, thereby adjusting the client’s goals; and it may better the client’s
socioeconomic situation . . . perhaps because the legal representative also acts as a coordinator of
official and community resources.
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Nevertheless, the paucity of evidence regarding the positive effects of
representation in general, let alone in any particular unrepresented individual’s
situation, may suggest that Americans are acting reasonably in seeking to handle
many of their legal problems without lawyers while reserving their funds for
other uses. Allowing greater non-lawyer involvement in the legal market would
only drastically alter the decision-making calculus of low- and middle-income
people if legal services were to be provided at little to no cost.132
C. BEYOND ACCESS TO JUSTICE AS ACCESS TO REPRESENTATION

To question the benefits of attorney representation in specific contexts may
raise doubts about its value generally.133 Nevertheless, if the value of attorney
representation is not assumed in all cases, access to justice initiatives could be
focused on providing individuals with attorneys in situations where attorneys are
most useful and effective.
Much of the support for access to justice initiatives comes not from their
impact on the lives of low- and middle-income people, but from the perceived
benefit to the legal system in increasing representation rates.134 The unrepresented are widely viewed, fairly or unfairly, as imposing strains on
the legal system. As expressed by New York State’s Task Force to Expand Access
to Civil Legal Services:
[U]nrepresented parties require repeated adjournments and cannot present or
resolve their cases that otherwise could be resolved by counsel without the need
for protracted litigation . . . . [L]ack of counsel [also] undermines the Judiciary’s core function of serving as a neutral arbiter of disputes when Judges
struggle to help vulnerable unrepresented litigants.135

Eliminating “protracted litigation” and facilitating the role of judges qua
“neutral arbiters” may be worthwhile societal goals. However, these goals are not

Greiner & Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation, supra note 118, at 2206. But see Erica J. Hashimoto,
Defending the Right of Self-Representation: An Empirical Look at the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L.
REV. 423, 428–29 (2007) (suggesting that self-representation may guard against the poor preparation of
appointed counsel and also further ideological interests).
132. Cf. Kritzer, supra note 27, at 269 (“Making judgments about the demand for legal services, and the
impact of income on that demand, is difficult if we are looking at services that are provided at no cost.”).
133. See Mark Osiel, Book Review, Lawyers as Monopolists, Aristocrats and Entrepreneurs, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 2009, 2031 (1990) (noting the legal profession’s emphasis on its esteem).
134. See 2010 N.Y. REPORT, supra note 100, at 20 (“The provision of civil legal services is the essential
ingredient for resolving disputes before they get to court and settling them efficiently and effectively when cases
do end up in court.”); see also Engler, supra note 100, at 2053 (“The prevalence of unrepresented litigants
creates strains on the system.”). But see Greiner & Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation, supra note 118, at
2124–25 (reporting that representation delayed the resolution of unemployment benefits claims). New York
State has calculated that legal aid directed towards preventing homelessness saved the state $355,000,000 from
2005 to 2009. 2010 N.Y. REPORT, supra note 100, at 25.
135. See, e.g., 2010 N.Y. REPORT, supra note 100, at 9, 12 (noting effect on businesses, judges, and lawyers).
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necessarily compatible with the priorities and interests of low- and middleincome people.
Indeed, as scholars have observed, one means to avoid “protracted litigation”
is for lawyers to pressure unsophisticated clients to settle or otherwise waive their
right to be heard.136 Conceiving of access to justice as access to some
representation ignores the very real differences in both the quality and type of
representation that individuals of limited means are likely to receive.137 The
desire of judges to act as “neutral arbiters” can also be antithetical to the interests
of low- and middle-income people insofar as they are opposed by more moneyed
adversaries.138
To be sure, unrepresented parties are sometimes pressured to take ill-advised
settlements. There is also no guarantee that judges will safeguard the rights of
unrepresented litigants.139 But a more feasible and effective alternative than
seeking to ensure that every litigant has a representative140 would be to more
closely regulate the dealings between attorneys and unrepresented individuals
and impose additional obligations on judges vis-à-vis the unrepresented.141
For example, attorneys who negotiate settlements on behalf of their clients
with unrepresented parties could be required to specifically advise these parties to
review the settlement terms with their own counsel or advisor.142 Attorneys are
currently afforded remarkable latitude in dealing with unrepresented parties.143
At minimum, this will clarify the attorney’s role and signal to unrepresented

136. See, e.g., Terrence C. Halliday & Robert L. Nelson, Lawyers, Structure, and Power, 36 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 885, 888 (2011) (“It is personal client lawyers, low in the prestige hierarchy of the bar, who might exert
greater influence over their clients.”); Cramton, supra note 9, at 555 (warning lawyers of dangers of “abusive
paternalism” towards unsophisticated clients); see also Katherine R. Kruse, Beyond Cardboard Clients in Legal
Ethics, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 103, 129 (2010) (suggesting that attorneys should not reduce their clients’
varied interests into predetermined legal categories).
137. See Pearce, supra note 113, at 969 (“The organized bar . . . refuses to acknowledge that our legal system
promises equal justice under the law, but allows justice to be bought and sold.”).
138. See generally Sande L. Buhai, Access to Justice for Unrepresented Litigants: A Comparative
Perspective, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 979, 982 (2009) (“Supporters of the American system continue to point to the
need for impartial judges . . . Judges who are willing to help both sides, as needed, do not necessarily have to be
perceived as biased. Passivity and impartiality are not the same thing.”).
139. See Engler, supra note 100, at 2015–6 (reviewing empirical research on judges’ silencing of
unrepresented individuals).
140. As Barton and Bibas observe, “[E]ven though criminal defendants do enjoy the Gideon right to counsel,
the quality and availability of indigent criminal defense remain hobbled by inadequate funding. Gideon’s
shortcomings in the criminal context should caution us [in the civil context].”). See Bibas & Barton, supra note
119, at 968.
141. Cf. Russell Engler, Out of Sight and Out of Line: The Need for Regulation of Lawyers’Negotiations with
Unrepresented Poor Persons, 85 CAL. L. REV. 79, 83 (1997) (suggesting that a range of responses are needed to
ensure that lawyers do not improperly negotiate with unrepresented parties).
142. See id. at 138 (“Ethical rules could . . . impose a duty of fairness on a lawyer negotiating with an
unrepresented adversary, prohibit a lawyer from obtaining an unconscionable agreement from an unrepresented
party, or impose on the lawyer duties toward the tribunal and/or the unrepresented adversary different from
those where the adverse party is represented.”).
143. MODEL RULES R. 4.3, cmt. 2 provides:
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individuals that they should carefully review the settlement documents.144 A few
states already require judges to supervise settlements involving unrepresented
persons to ensure that they understand the settlement terms.145
Conceiving of access to justice solely in terms of representation rates also
leads to a misallocation of scarce legal aid and pro bono resources.146 Legal aid
attorneys are guided largely by office custom and their subjective experiences in
determining which clients to serve and how to serve them because of an absence
of reliable empirical research on attorney effectiveness.147 The median attorney
in the United States currently provides thirty hours of pro bono service,148 which
is not only fewer than the fifty hours exhorted by the Model Rules149 but is plainly
insufficient to resolve all but uncomplicated matters. An access to justice agenda
devoted to providing high quality legal assistance in a much smaller number of
situations may not improve representation rates, but it could allow low- and
middle-income people to more effectively vindicate their rights.

IV. EXPANDING ACCESS TO JUSTICE WITHOUT CORPORATE DELIVERY OF
LEGAL SERVICES
This Article has questioned the assumptions that problems with access to
justice are caused by the alleged high cost of legal services and that all legal
problems should be addressed by attorneys. Nevertheless, there are undoubtedly
a substantial number of Americans who would benefit from legal assistance but

So long as the lawyer has explained that the lawyer represents an adverse party and is not representing
the person, the lawyer may inform the person of the terms on which the lawyer’s client will enter into
an agreement or settle a matter, prepare documents that require the person’s signature and explain the
lawyer’s own view of the meaning of the document or the lawyer’s view of the underlying legal
obligations.
144. The Model Rules acknowledge the importance of the unrepresented person understanding the lawyer’s
role, but there is no affirmative obligation to clarify unless the lawyer “knows or reasonably should know that
the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer’s role in the matter.” See MODEL RULES R. 4.3.
145. See Engler, supra note 100, at 378–79 (tracing developments in Massachusetts and California).
Massachusetts advises that:
Judges should review the terms of settlement agreements, even those resulting from ADR, with the
parties. Judges should determine whether the agreement was entered into voluntarily. If there are
specific provisions through which a self-represented litigant waives substantive rights, judges should
determine, to the extent possible, whether the waiver is knowing and voluntary.
Id. at 378 (citation omitted).
146. See Selbin et al., supra note 31, at 52; see also Barton & Bibas, supra note 119, at 992 (“[T]here seems
to be little benefit to providing lawyers across the board, especially in simple cases.”).
147. See Laura Abel, Designing Access: Using Institutional Design to Improve Decision Making about the
Distribution of Free Civil Legal Aid, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 61, 75 (2013).
148. See ABA, Supporting Justice III: A Report on the Pro Bono Work of America’s Lawyers, iv, March 2013,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/probono_public_service/ls_pb_Supporting_J
ustice_III_final.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/26SJ-J3G7].
149. MODEL RULES R. 6.1(a).

88

THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS

[Vol. 29:63

fail to realize it and others who cannot locate qualified attorneys.150 Low- and
middle-income individuals also lack access to information that can aid them in
representing themselves. This Part will explore how the legal profession might
address these problems without fundamentally altering how legal services are
delivered in the United States.
A. EDUCATING THE PUBLIC

Law is a social construct, but laymen often do not conceive of their problems
in legal terms.151 For example, people may suspect that they have been taken
advantage of or injured without knowing that their legal rights have been violated
and that there is a potential remedy.152
Empirical research confirms that Americans cannot reliably identify their legal
needs.153 The State of Georgia’s legal needs study found that seventy-three
percent of interviewees were unaware that they had legal needs.154 The 2014
CNSS Study, which examined a wider range of legal issues, found that only in
nine percent of situations were interviewees aware that their civil justice
problems were legal in nature.155 This inability to identify a problem as legal
makes it highly improbable that individuals will seek legal assistance.156
Even when Americans conceive of their problems in legal terms, they struggle
to find competent attorneys. Although most states have not-for-profit attorney
referral services, very few people use them.157 These services also provide little
more than the name of a participating attorney who practices in the area of law
and is in good standing with the bar.158 Instead, people rely on their personal
networks to find attorneys. According to the ABA Survey, of the households that
consulted with an attorney, thirty-two percent of low-income households and
thirty-eight percent of moderate-income households located the attorney through

150. For a discussion of corporations’ ability to lower search costs, see Hadfield, Cost of Law, supra note 10,
at 9–10.
151. Sandefur, supra note 23, at 236.
152. See id.
153. See supra Part II(A); see also Sandefur, supra note 23, at 232 (“Among the most important reasons that
people do not take their problems to lawyers is that they do not think of their problems as legal.”).
154. LSC REPORT, supra note 5, at C-1. A study in the United Kingdom found that just over ten percent of
legal problems were conceived of as legal in nature. Balmer, supra note 37, at iii.
155. CNSS Study, supra note 40, at 14.
156. According to a recent study in the United Kingdom, individuals who know that they have a legal
problem are six to seven times more likely to seek out legal assistance than those who do not. See Sandefur,
supra note 23, at 236; see also CNSS Study, supra note 40, at 14 (“[Respondents were] significantly more likely
to have used or considered using lawyers for the situations that they believed to be ‘legal’ (39% of instances)
than for those they did not (14% of instances).”).
157. See Sandefur, supra note 23, at 242.
158. See, e.g., Benjamin P. Cooper, Attorney Self-Disclosure, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 697, 707-08 (2011); Linda
Morton, Finding a Suitable Lawyer: Why Consumers Can’t Always Get What They Want and What the Legal
Profession Should Do About It, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283, 301 (1992).
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a friend or family member, and approximately the same percentage of respondents sought out attorneys with whom they were already acquainted.159 Despite
the advent of the Internet, most consumers still locate legal services in this
manner.160 Those without extensive networks and preexisting relationships with
lawyers will naturally struggle to secure the appropriate representation.161
The public also has very little information about the cost of legal services.
Although the Supreme Court in Bates held that lawyers could not be prohibited
from advertising the prices of certain routine legal services,162 few attorneys
advertise their prices.163 As noted, no comprehensive study has been undertaken
to examine what people pay for legal services or what attorneys or firms charge
for their services.164 Moreover, substantial numbers of low-income Americans
appear to be unaware of legal aid or mistakenly believe that they do not qualify.
The ABA Survey found that only half of low-income households knew of free
legal services and only thirty-six percent correctly surmised that they qualified.165 Knowledge of legal aid has not improved in recent years.166
Although informational deficiencies likely cannot be completely overcome,
the legal profession could support expanded civics education and make legal
information far more available than it does presently.167 To remedy the public’s
inability to conceive of their legal problems in legal terms, state bars could launch
public education campaigns to raise awareness of how lawyers assist with
common problems. The Virginia Bar was awarded a newspaper advertising

159. ABA SURVEY, supra note 5, at 26.
160. A 2011 survey found that 46 percent of those surveyed would rely on friends, family members or
colleagues to locate an attorney; 34 percent would contact a lawyer they used in the past; and only 7 percent
would use the Internet. See Sandefur, supra note 23, at 243 (citations omitted). For a critique of Internet ratings
systems for lawyers, see Cooper, supra note 158, at 707–09.
161. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 158, at 706 (“[T]rying to find a lawyer by word of mouth is only effective
if consumers know people who know good lawyers. Many individuals simply do not have the kind of
connections that are going to help them find a good lawyer.”); Morton, supra note 158, at 290 (“[N]onusers of
legal services find commercial and organized sources of information more important than users.”) (citation
omitted).
162. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977).
163. See generally Linda Sorenson Ewald, Content Regulation of Lawyer Advertising: An Era of Change, 3
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 429, 476 (1990) (“Most legal advertisements do not include a range of fees or hourly
rates. Sophisticated clients most likely realize that such information is relatively meaningless . . . But such
advertisements may mislead unsophisticated clients . . . ”); Richard L. Abel, How the Plaintiff’s Bar Bars
Plaintiffs, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 345, 358 (2006). (“[A]dvertising tells clients little about competence, price,
speed, or responsiveness . . . [M]any states discourage price advertising.”).
164. Sandefur, supra note 23, at 227.
165. ABA SURVEY, supra note 5, at 26.
166. See LSC REPORT, supra note 5, at D-1 (stating that only about twenty-three percent of individuals in
Utah and twenty percent of individuals in Alabama were aware that free legal assistance was available).
167. An existing initiative is iCivics, launched by former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor,
which provides interactive online learning resources for students. See Our Story, ICIVICS, https://www.icivics.
org/our-story [https://perma.cc/9S4Q-EEQB] (last visited Feb. 4, 2015). For a discussion of lawyers as civics
teachers, see generally Bruce A. Green & Russell G. Pearce, Public Service Must Begin at Home: The Lawyer
as Civics Teacher in Everyday Practice, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1207, 1214-1219 (2009).
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award for such a campaign in 1999.168 The campaign clearly set out in plain
terms the variety of services attorneys provide, which ranged from stopping
mistreatment in nursing homes and securing Medicare benefits to helping people
start businesses.169
Ethical reforms may also be necessary because anti-solicitation and advertising rules contribute to informational deficiencies by impeding attorneys and firms
from marketing and publicizing their services.170 For example, Model Rule 7.3
prohibits lawyers from soliciting professional employment in person, via phone,
or other real-time contact when they are motivated partly by pecuniary gain.171
While the Rule seeks to protect potential clients from being coerced into
accepting legal representation against their will, it is overbroad insofar as it bars
virtually all solicitations of individuals with whom the lawyer is unacquainted,
regardless of whether the lawyer exerts any pressure on the potential client.
Model Rule 7.3 could simply prohibit duress and harassment, with special
protections in place for individuals who are known to be especially vulnerable.172
The Model Rules also prohibit lawyers from paying for recommendations from
non-lawyers who may regularly interact with populations that are in need of legal
assistance.173 The result of this policy is that lawyers must engage in costly mass
advertising rather than marketing their services to individuals who are wellpositioned to refer clients who are in most need of legal assistance.174 While
allowing attorneys to pay for referrals may lead potential clients to attorneys who
are not necessarily the most qualified to handle their cases, a greater danger is that
168. See Public Education Campaign, ST. BAR OF VA, http://www.vsb.org/site/publications/public-educationcampaign [http://perma.cc/YL86-JU25] (last updated June 2, 2014). Retirement Ad, STATE BAR OF VIRGINIA,
http://www.vsb.org/publications/ads/images/retirement.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q6EA-BEX3] (last visited June 2,
2014).
169. Id.; see, e.g., Retirement Ad, STATE BAR OF VA., http://www.vsb.org/publications/ads/images/retirement.
pdf [http://perma.cc/Q6EA-BEX3] (last updated June 2, 2014).
170. Scholars have long advocated for the abandonment of restrictive anti-solicitation and advertising rules.
See, e.g., Judith L. Maute, Facing 21st Century Realities, 32 MISS. C. L. REV. 345, 346 (2013); Rhode,
Connecting Principles to Practice, supra note 36, at 416-16; Monroe H. Freedman, Advertising and Solicitation by Lawyers: A Proposed Redraft of Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 4 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 183, 184 (1976).
171. MODEL RULES R. 7.3(a). Some states also prohibit solicitation by mail for a period of time in certain
cases. See, e.g., GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.3(a)(3) (2013).
172. Model Rule 7.3(b) already prohibits duress and harassment in solicitation, whether it be in-person or
written, as well as contacting individuals who have made it known that they do not wish to be contacted. See
MODEL RULES R. 7.3. Some states prohibit any communications for the purpose of soliciting business if “the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the physical, emotional or mental state of the person is such that
the person could not exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer.” See, e.g., GA. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 7.3(a)(4) (2013).
173. MODEL RULES R. 7.2(b).
174. See Drake D. Hill, Deconstructing the Prophylactic Ban on Lawyer Solicitation, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 875,
896 (1989) (“By bringing the legal services consumer in contact with the person providing those services,
consumers can judge for themselves . . . Like advertising, solicitation can inspire legal consumers to seek
additional information about the lawyer from other sources, which in turn may reduce the likelihood of
consumer deception.”).
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people in need of legal assistance will be unaware of where to obtain such
services. Any risk of undue influence in the selection of counsel could be
mitigated by requiring attorneys to disclose referral payments to prospective
clients.175
The Model Rules are more lax in their treatment of attorney advertising by
prohibiting only false and misleading communications.176 However, many states
extensively regulate attorney advertising, which limits both its use and effectiveness. Some states require advertisements to be pre-approved by the state bar.177
Others do not permit the use of actors or monikers.178 New Jersey prohibits
“drawings, animations, dramatizations, music, or lyrics in connection with
televised advertising” and does not allow counsel to advertise characteristics that
are not clearly related to legal competence.179
Whatever the merits of such regulations, they prevent lawyers from advertising
the way that other businesses, including some alternative providers of legal
services, do.180 As Professor Smolla has observed:
Modern advertising is all about being “catchy” and using the devices of drama,
arts, color, sound, fiction, fantasy, or comedy . . . A lawyer who dares to be
catchy, however, is in danger of being caught—and disciplined. Lawyers act at
their peril if they dare to make their advertising interesting, through the use of
logos, symbols, catchy phrases, jingles, music, dance, humor, parody, surprise,
sarcasm, drama, puffery, or figurative hyperbole.181

Some states also specifically regulate the advertising of prices. In Kentucky,
attorneys must file detailed descriptions of the routine services for which they are
advertising a fee.182 In New York, attorneys must honor their advertised rates
unless their clients agree in writing that the advertised rates do not apply to the

175. See MODEL RULES R. 7.2(b)(4) (permitting attorneys to enter into reciprocal referral arrangements with
lawyers and non-lawyers as long as these arrangements are nonexclusive and are disclosed to clients).
176. See MODEL RULES R. 7.1.
177. See, e.g., NEV. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.2A(a) (2013); TEX. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.07(b)
(2013).
178. See, e.g., FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.7-15 (2013) (prohibiting use of image or voice of
celebrities or “an actor portraying an authority figure”); S.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.1(e) (2013)
(prohibiting advertisements that contain “a nickname, moniker, or trade name that implies an ability to obtain
results in a matter”).
179. N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.2(a) (2013).
180. For example, LegalZoom regularly features Robert Shapiro, one of its co-founders, who is a
well-known Los Angeles attorney who formerly represented O.J. Simpson even though the company does not
actually provide legal advice, let alone legal advice from Mr. Shapiro. See generally Brandon Schwarzentraub,
Electronic Wills & the Internet: Is LegalZoom Involved in the Unauthorized Practice of Law or Is Their Success
Simply Ruffling the Legal Profession’s Feathers?, 5 EST. PLAN. CMTY. PROP. L.J. 1, 9–10 (2012) (summarizing
allegations against LegalZoom in Connecticut and California with respect to deceptive practices).
181. Rodney A. Smolla, Lawyer Advertising and the Dignity of the Profession, 59 ARK. L. REV. 437, 460
(2006) (emphasis omitted).
182. See Ky. Sup. Ct. R. 3.130 (7.04).
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needed services.183 Such regulations serve to guard against a “bait and
switch,”184 but the public is deprived of useful information when attorneys do not
advertise their prices in order to have greater flexibility in negotiating fees and
rates at a later time.185 Even in states without such regulations, many lawyers are
reluctant to advertise their prices for fear that they will be viewed as misleading
by disciplinary authorities.186 In the era of ubiquitous advertising and social
media, prospective clients may be far less susceptible to the “bait and switch”
than state regulators believe. In any event, state bars could mitigate this problem
by publishing the ranges of fees charged by attorneys within their jurisdictions
for basic services so that the public will be wary of fees that fall far outside of
these ranges.
Anti-solicitation and advertising regulations are designed to not only protect
the public but safeguard the image of lawyers.187 Nevertheless, as important as
such considerations may be, access to justice is undermined by the legal
profession’s maintenances of ethics rules that keep the public uninformed of the
importance and availability of legal services.
B. EMBRACING THE INTERNET AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES

In addition to maintaining regulatory barriers that hamper the dissemination of
information about legal services, the legal profession has been slow to adjust to a
world in which more and more people turn to the Internet to inform themselves
about their legal problems.188 Although information found on the Internet can be

183. See N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.1(r) (2013).
184. Ewald, supra note 163, at 476–77.
185. As the Supreme Court remarked in Bates, “Although . . . the bar retains the power to correct omissions
that have the effect of presenting an inaccurate picture, the preferred remedy is more disclosure, rather than
less.” Bates, 433 US at 375. There was at one time much speculation that advertising of legal services would
lead to a drop in the price of legal services. See, e.g., id. at 380; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., Why Lawyers
Should Be Allowed to Advertise: A Market Analysis of Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV.1084, 1109 (1983).
Empirical research post-Bates supported this view. See Nora Freeman Engstrom, Attorney Advertising & the
Contingent Fee Cost Paradox, 65 STAN. L. REV. 633, 635–36 (2013). However, as Professor Engstrom has
explained, the firms that advertised in the aftermath of Bates do not resemble the firms that advertise today. Id. at
639. Indeed, the vast majority of advertising is now done by personal injury firms and the fees of personal injury
firms have not dropped even as tort recoveries have risen. See id. at 638–39. Moreover, personal injury firms
that advertise appear to charge more than those that do not. See id. at 639 (internal citations omitted).
186. See Ewald, supra note 163, at 474 (“Any communication that describes the fee for a particular legal
service has the potential to mislead or deceive if the service is not clearly defined . . . [T]o the unsophisticated
client, even the term ‘routine,’ ‘simple,’ or ‘uncontested’ may be confusing.”).
187. See Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 624–25 (1995). But see William E. Hornsby, Jr. &
Kurt Schimmel, Regulating Lawyer Advertising: Public Images and the Irresistible Aristotelian Impulse, 9 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 325, 336 (1996) (“[T]here have been dozens, if not scores, of research efforts gauging attitudes,
opinions and images resulting from lawyer advertising. The consensus among this research is that lawyers
dislike lawyer advertising, but consumers are moderately positive toward it.”).
188. See Catherine J. Lanctot, Attorney-Client Relationships in Cyberspace: The Peril and the Promise, 49
DUKE L.J. 147, 151 (1999) (“[W]hile the legal profession retains its historical ambivalence toward technological
advances, laypeople are gravitating to the Internet to seek help with their daily legal problems . . . .”); see also
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misused, the legal profession should embrace this inexorable cultural trend to
assist those who seek to address their legal problems on their own.
The chief impediment to increased information-sharing over the Internet is that
attorneys risk unintentionally creating attorney—client relationships.189 Although lawyers can provide general legal information to help educate the public
without forming attorney—client relationships, they cannot give legal advice.190
However, the distinction between general legal information and legal advice is
tenuous in the context of the Internet.
For example, persons on the Internet might request “general legal information”
that is nevertheless specific to their particular situations and upon which other
similarly situated persons might come to rely.191 Some attorneys answer such
questions despite the ethical perils,192 but the public would receive better
information if there were greater attorney participation.
The Model Rules already allow lawyers to provide “short-term limited legal
services” under the auspices of nonprofit and court-annexed legal services
programs without the expectation that the individual seeking advice will obtain
continuing representation.193 This model could be extended to Internet forums as
long as the questioners are advised to seek further counsel and are fully informed
of the limits of the legal advice they receive from participating attorneys.194

Cassandra Burke Robertson, Private Ordering in the Market for Professional Services, 94 B.U. L. REV. 179,
200 (2014) (suggesting that communication technology and the Internet increasingly act as a substitute for
professional advice).
189. See, e.g., ABA Comm. On Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 10-457 (2010) (discussing
lawyer websites); N.M. Bar Op. 2001-1 (2001), http://www.nmbar.org/NmbarDocs/AboutUs/committees/Ethics/
2000-2002/2001-1.pdf [http://perma.cc/J3MK-89JT] (indicating that attorneys may create attorney–client
relationships on the internet notwithstanding disclaimers).
190. See, e.g., N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.1(q) (r) (2013); D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm. Op. 316,
Lawyers’ Participation in Chatroom with Internet Users Seeking Legal Information, See, e.g., ABA Comm. on
Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 10-457 (2010) (discussing lawyer websites); N.M. Bar Op. 2001-1
(2001), http://www.nmbar.org/NmbarDocs/AboutUs/committees/Ethics/2000-2002/2001-1.pdf [http://perma.cc/
J3MK-89JT] (indicating that attorneys may create attorney–client relationships on the internet notwithstanding
disclaimers).
191. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 10-457 (2010), http://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/professional_responsibility/ethics_opinion_10_457.
authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/877V-VEBT] (“[L]awyers who answer fact-specific legal questions may be
characterized as offering personal legal advice, especially if the lawyer is responding to a question that can
reasonably be understood to refer to the questioner’s individual circumstances.”); N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 7.1, cmt 9 (2013) (“A lawyer . . . should carefully refrain from giving or appearing to give a general
solution applicable to all apparently similar individual problems, because slight changes in fact situations may
require a material variance in the applicable advice.”).
192. See Ask a Lawyer, AVVO, http://www.avvo.com/ask-a-lawyer [http://perma.cc/3X8S-H2HE] (last
visited Oct. 10, 2015); see also Lanctot, supra note 188, at 248 (“Neither courts nor bar counsel is likely to be
sympathetic to lawyers who have given negligent advice [in cyberspace] and then try to rely on boilerplate
disclaimers to absolve them of responsibility for harm.”).
193. MODEL RULES R. 6.5(a).
194. Compare Cal. Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 2003-164 (2003) (suggesting
that no attorney-client relationship is established when an individual asks a specific question to an attorney on a
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Some questioners might eventually seek to obtain full representation whereas
those that do not will at least have a more informed understanding of their legal
situations.
The legal profession has also historically opposed efforts to assist the
unrepresented in fulfilling basic legal tasks.195 However, companies such as
LegalZoom and Rocket Lawyer that provide basic legal documents and forms to
consumers over the Internet are now firmly established and growing rapidly.196
Although there are legitimate concerns about the quality of the services provided
by these companies, as well as their business practices,197 their emergence shows
that there is strong demand for do-it-yourself legal documents.
State bars nevertheless continue to cede much of this business to for-profit
corporations. A 2011 study found that twenty-four states have extensive plain
language court forms for use, fourteen have limited court forms for use, and
twelve states do not have any such forms.198 A few legislatures have also
developed standardized non-litigation documents such as wills.199 If more states
were to follow suit, this would reduce the risk of individuals relying on flawed or
outdated documents produced by for-profit companies.
The ABA appears to be becoming more accepting of the Internet as a means of
educating the public.200 But, even without formal cooperation from the organized
bar, entrepreneurs are developing products that facilitate greater access to legal
information. One such product, created by A2J Author, assists self-represented

radio call-in show or similar format), and Cal. Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op.
2005-168 (2005) (suggesting that disclaimers can prevent the creation of attorney-client relationship with
advice seeker), with MODEL RULES R. 6.5 cmt. 2 (2013) (suggesting that an attorney in a limited representation
program should advise client to seek further counsel).
195. See Rhode, Professionalism in Perspective, supra note 9, at 705 (noting state bars’ longstanding
hostility to self-help programs).
196. See John O. McGinnis & Russell G. Pearce, The Great Disruption: How Machine Intelligence Will
Transform the Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of Legal Services, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041, 3058 (2014).
Document generation is a $400 million industry and is expected to grow by ten to twenty percent per year. Id. at
3059.
197. LegalZoom’s website contains the following as part of its disclaimer: “Although LegalZoom takes
every reasonable effort to ensure that the information on our website and documents are up-to-date and legally
sufficient, the legal information on this site is not legal advice and is not guaranteed to be correct, complete or
up-to-date.” LegalZoom Disclaimer, LEGALZOOM, https://www.legalzoom.com/disclaimer.html [https://perma.
cc/6UUB-2G4A] (last visited Oct. 10, 2015). Most of the litigation surrounding LegalZoom has involved
allegations of unauthorized practice of law. See generally Isaac Figueras, The LegalZoom Identity Crisis: Legal
Form Provider or Lawyer in Sheep’s Clothing?, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1419, 1430–37 (examining cases in
North Carolina, Missouri, and Ohio).
198. See Charles R. Dyer et al., Improving Access to Justice: Plain Language Family Law Court Forms in
Washington State, 11 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 1065, 1073–74 (2011) (citation omitted).
199. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 6240 (2013); ME. REV. STAT. Title 18A, § 2-514 (2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 700.123c (2014).
200. The ABA recently announced a pilot program with Rocket Lawyer to have lawyers provide legal advice
and documents over Rocket Lawyer’s platform. See Jennifer Smith, Online Legal Services Company to Team up
with American Bar Association, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 11, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/08/11/online-legalservices-company-to-team-up-with-american-bar-association/ [http://perma.cc/AD6Q-P8L9].
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litigants by providing a graphically illustrated step-by-step process to complete
court documents.201 A Maryland company recently received significant recognition for developing an application that guides individuals through the mechanics
of the criminal record expungement process and refers them to lawyers.202
These technologies are not substitutes for dedicated attorney assistance.203
However, as the preceding examples illustrate, significant innovation can occur
in the legal market without having corporations directly deliver legal services.
Although the Internet and new technologies should not be viewed as a panacea
for lack of access to justice,204 they can help the public better understand its legal
needs, navigate basic legal issues, and find attorneys in situations where they seek
attorney involvement.

CONCLUSION
Lack of access to justice is a serious and intractable societal problem.205 To
expand access to justice, the legal profession cannot continue to focus on how
legal services are delivered in the hope of lowering costs while ignoring factors
that depress the demand for legal services.
The notion that corporate delivery of legal services will expand access to
justice is based on several misconceptions. Although most legal problems are
addressed without attorneys, this does not signify that there is a massive unmet
demand for legal services. Every civil justice problem does not merit attorney
involvement, and individuals sometimes act reasonably in seeking to resolve
their problems on their own. Nor does the high cost of legal services prevent most
people from accessing legal services. The inability of Americans to conceive of
their problems as legal and lack of appreciation for the value of legal assistance
play a much more critical role.
Even if corporations could, through improved economies of scale, lower the
cost of some legal services to the point that more low- and middle-income

201. The tool is provided under the auspices of the Chicago Kent School of Law. See A2J Author, ILL. INST.
TECH. CHICAGO-KENT C.L., http://www.kentlaw.iit.edu/institutes-centers/center-for-access-to-justice-andtechnology/a2j-author [http://perma.cc/XXH9-NVYM] (last visited Dec. 19, 2015).
202. See Anna Stolley Persky, New App Helps People Expunge Their Criminal Records, ABA J. (Nov. 1,
2014), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/wipe_out_new_app_helps_people_expunge_their_records
[http://perma.cc/M24E-AM5E].
203. As Harry Surden has suggested, the purpose of advanced computer systems is not to replace human
lawyers but rather to “automate[] certain typical ‘easy-cases’ so that the attorney’s cognitive efforts and time can
be conserved for those tasks likely to actually require higher-order legal skills.” Harry Surden, Machine
Learning and Law, 89 WASH L. REV. 87, 101 (2014).
204. Id. at 88–89.
205. See, e.g., Pearce, supra note 113, at 969 (“The organized bar . . . refuses to acknowledge that our legal
system promises equal justice under the law, but allows justice to be bought and sold.”); Luban, supra note 7, at
245 (“America’s thirty million poor people have long lists of needs, and legal representation may be far down
the list. But that misses the point. Even if silencing doctrines are not among life’s gravest injustices, they
represent an outrageous violation of what the legal system should be.”).
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individuals would purchase them, they are unlikely to be able to make litigation
and other cost-prohibitive legal services affordable. Much legal work remains
bespoke, and the public is unlikely to benefit from more high volume providers of
legal services.206
The legal profession bears some responsibility for lack of access to justice by
failing to promote greater understanding of the law and maintaining ethical rules
that impede lawyers from soliciting business and effectively marketing their
services. It has also been slow to utilize the internet to make basic legal forms and
documents available. As a result, the public has inadequate access to legal
information.
Nevertheless, even with better access to information, many individuals will
continue to resolve their legal problems on their own and reserve discretionary
income for other uses. There is very little data to substantiate that representation
leads to better outcomes, especially with respect to uncomplicated matters. The
legal profession’s insistence that legal representation is always valuable leads to
the misallocation of legal aid and pro bono resources that should be targeted to
serious situations where a skilled attorney might actually make a difference.
An access to justice agenda with the limited ambition of creating more
low-cost legal services providers, through the corporate delivery of legal services
or otherwise, may marginally increase representation rates.207 But it is a
disservice to low- and middle-income people.

206. Cf. Pearce, supra note 113, at 970 (“[B]ar leadership has focused . . . on providing more lawyers to
low-income people . . . Given that our society primarily distributes legal services through the market and
employs an adversary system of justice, the bar’s proposals . . . would have a very limited impact in advancing
equal justice.”).
207. Cf. Gary Blasi, Framing Access to Justice: Beyond Perceived Justice for Individuals, 42 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 913, 914 (2009) (“[I]f we begin with the limited ambition of providing counsel (or purported alternatives)
only in individual, well-defined legal disputes, then that is as far as we are likely to get . . . .”).

